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Abstract 
We report first results from a large scale randomized control trial of different forms of energy 
consumption feedback facilitated by smart meters and smart phone feedback apps. Nearly 40,000 
customers of a large energy retailer in the UK were exposed to either very basic feedback apps - i.e. 
simply giving consumers access to monthly energy consumption - or more advanced feedback 
involving peer group comparisons as well as dis-aggregation of total electricity consumption. We find 
that more advanced feedback can lead to an average consumption reduction of nearly 4% (Intent to 
Treat). Taking into account that a large number of customers never sign in to any feedback apps 
suggests that the reduction effect among customers that do sign in is up to 12%. The smart meter 
installation was implemented by different installation firms across our sample and we find the 
reduction effect only for one customers of one installer who displays higher capabilities along a 
number of metrics. This could suggest that achieving energy preservation objectives does not only 
depend on the technology involved but also on the capabilities and skills of firms installing those 
technologies. In the UK, smart meters are by default installed with In Home Displays (IHD) that 
provide real time feedback on energy use. Some of the customers in our sample did not receive an 
IHD and we explore if this had any impact on the consumption reduction effect described above. 
Customers with (and without) IHD comprise a self-selected sample so we have to be careful in 
drawing causal conclusions. However, we do not find any evidence that any energy reducing effect is 
contingent on IHDs. 
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1 Introduction
By 2020 - according to EU legislation - most households in Europe should be "smart" metered.1
What effect will this increase in smart metering have on consumers, electricity consumption, and
electricity markets more broadly?
The answer to this question this depends to a large extent on whether and how consumers
interact with the meters. In the UK, energy producers are mandated to both install smart me-
ters and provide so-called In Home Displays (IHDs) that provide real-time energy consumption
information to customers in the hope that such information will induce energy-saving behavioural
changes. However, energy firms have insisted that similar, if not stronger, behavioural changes
could be achieved by providing energy consumption feedback via a smart phone apps, which would
dramatically reduce costs relative to universal provision of IHDs.
We test this claim using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) wherein customers who were
invited to receive a smart meter installation were divided into 4 intervention groups with the
following characteristics:
1This is part of the legislation to create a joint energy market across the EU; see e.g. http://ses.jrc.ec.
europa.eu/smart-metering-deployment-european-union
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1. IHD: IHD and basic app reporting monthly energy consumption;
2. SP APP: No IHD and a more advanced app including up to daily energy consumption
information;
3. ONZO: No IHD and an even more advanced app providing comparisons with other customers
and demand dis-aggregation. This option is named after ONZO a software and data analytics
company that provided this functionality.2
4. CAD: Installation of a so-called consumer access device (CAD) that provides higher reso-
lution remote energy monitoring. This allows providing real-time consumption information
via smart phone app.
Since the electricity utility contracted four different installers, a few complexities arose during
experimental implementation. Each installer is typically focused on a particular part of the country.
In order to simplify the task for these installers, any one installer would only ever deliver two
treatment options: one non-IHD option and the default IHD option. Additionally, the ONZO
non-IHD alternative was rolled out by two different installers. These elements raise two potential
issues.
First, the effective treatment that participants receive is an interaction of a particular treatment
(e.g., ONZO app) with a particular installer. Hence, if we find differential responses to treatment,
it could be (partially) attributable to the inherent features of the feedback app or the manner in
which a particular installer administers the treatment. For instance, installers may vary in their
ability to explain the feedback app to customers. Second, it could be the case that any discernible
effect is specific to the population of customers assigned to any particular installer, creating the
illusion of an ‘installer effect’ when in fact the effect is driven by characteristics of the sub sample
treated by the installer.
2urlhttp://onzo.com/
This document provides some first results derived from the data that emerged from the exper-
iment. We will be obtaining more data in the near future, as the experiment is ongoing. As such,
these results are subject to change.
Our findings so far can be summarized as follows. There seems indeed to be a causal effect of the
ONZO software treatment, though only in conjunction with one of the installers tasked with rolling
out this treatment. Our initial estimates suggest that on average electricity consumption could
have reduced by up to 4% as a consequence of receiving the advanced ONZO app. This effect
occurs for the installer who overall has a better record in delivering Treatment 3 as instructed
(i.e. without providing an IHD). It is therefore possible that this installer (let’s call her Installer
3) is simply more competent and, therefore, better at training her customers to understand the
functionality of the ONZO app.
3In hindsight, it would have been advisable to adjust the software treatments in cases where for whatever reason
an IHD was given out so that an IHD would always come in conjunction with the basic software treatment from
option 1 above.
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An additional problem that emerged during the trial is that in most cases a mixed treatment
was administered, i.e. customers that were supposed to receive an advanced software treatment
with no IHD were in many cases provided with an IHD nonetheless. Two factors contributed
to this contamination. First, customers having heard about IHDs from friends or advertisements
then demanded the devices from the installers and, in this case, installers were instructed to give
in to customers’ demands. Second, in a number of cases, IHDs were simply given to customers
by mistake or because installers ignored instructions. This non-compliance implies that we cannot
fully ascertain whether any differences between treatment and control groups result from the effect
of advanced apps alone or whether they are the result of an interaction or complementarity between
software and IHD effects. Of course, we can analyze whether there are differences in effects between
treated with or without IHD. However, we cannot rule out that any such differences are driven
by self-selection into those groups. That said, we can search for evidence of such selection bias on
the basis of historic consumption data. This issue is of some urgency as one of the motivations for
conducting the RCT was the provision of evidence under the smart meter derogation. The smart
derogation was a temporary exemption granted by the UK government to some energy companies
from the requirement to provide IHDs in order to examine if IHDs are a necessary requirement of
behavioural changes by customers. 3
In the case of other treatments or other installers, we did not find significantly negative ef-
fects on energy consumption. As for CADs, we found a positive (though insignificant) effect on
consumption, which could be related to serious difficulties in the roll-out of CADs resulting in cus-
tomers’ not receiving any treatment. Hence, it could be the case that the CAD-assigned treatment
group is our best estimate for what happens to customers without IHD nor software.
In order to address the derogation question—i.e. can a given reduction be achieved with app-
only treatment, obviating the need to supply customers with costly IHDs?—we examine if there is a
difference between non-IHD assigned customers that have not received an IHD (non-IHD, non-IHD)
and customers that ended up with an IHD nevertheless (non-IHD, IHD). For installer group 3 we
do not find a significant difference between these two groups and the point estimates are of similar
size. We also do not find a significant difference between these two types of customers in their
historic energy consumption. Hence, we can be somewhat confident that there is no systematic
selection going on between these two groups and, therefore, it would seem that the ONZO effect is
not contingent on having received an IHD. However, the statistical test lacks power at present, so it
will be crucial to gain more observations from the ongoing trials before drawing strong conclusions.
2 Related Literature
Research in behavioural science has explored the effects of providing energy consumption feed-
back. While some experiments show that feedback provision can in some cases lead to energy
reductions in the residential sector (Allcott (2011)) the achievements of various experiments vary
widely. There have been several trials of feedback, but it is difficult to compare interventions
given they differ in the feedback mechanisms they rely on (Karlin et al. (2015)) as well as in their
design and structure (Faruqui et al. (2010)). A meta-study by Delmas et al. (2013) find the av-
erage effect of feedback to be 7.4%, ranging from 55% reduction to an increase of 18.5% in one
experiment. Faruqui et al. (2010) also find that the effect of a simple In-Home-Display (IHD) in
North America is on average 7%, but that customers being on prepayment schemes doubles it to
14% effect. In a different study, where the user-friendliness character of IHDs was emphasised
with its users and promoted its domestication achieved a 20% reduction Chen et al. (2014). Be-
havioural science explains that feedback provision triggers change through two mechanisms. First
the learning effect: consumers develop better knowledge about energy consumption. Second the
salience effect: consumers are constantly reminded about their energy use (Lynham et al. (2016)).
Energy consumption is abstract, non-sensory, and of low relevance to most individuals, so feedback
emphasises its financial, environmental, and social costs and helps consumers relate to their energy
use (Karlin et al. (2015)).
While information is necessary to induce behaviour change, it is not sufficient as demonstrated
by trials where consumers gain knowledge and awareness about their energy usage but do not
adopt sustainable behaviours (Naus et al. (2014); Frederiks et al. (2015)). Information will affect
how consumers value their flexibility and comfort (Buchanan et al. (2014)). Yet, their decisions in
terms of energy use also largely depend on contextual variables and personal circumstances that
vary across households (Karlin et al. (2015)): these can either hinder or support energy saving
initiatives, whether for environmental, social or economic reasons. It is thought that interventions
could overcome contextual and personal factors by taking into account household dynamics, rou-
tines, socio-cultural norms, and structures to achieve the transition to sustainable behaviours by
consumers (Buchanan et al. (2014)).
Several studies have documented the potential of a boomerang effect when the feedback mech-
anism is associated with descriptive norms, with consumers relaxing their habits and resting on
their laurels, thus leading to increases in consumption (Schultz et al., 2017). Alternative strategies
include goal comparison (citekarlin2015effects), social influence by making reference to a social
leader or using public commitment (Abrahamse and Steg (2013)), or individual audits (Delmas
et al. (2013)). In a paper by Chen et al. (2017)), it is shown that non-monetary messages empha-
sising the health and environmental benefit of energy conservation in India were more efficient in
yielding energy consumption reductions than monetary information.
Finally, other studies have examined whether dynamic pricing can decrease overall energy
consumption, and has been shown to be challenging (Faruqui et al. (2010)).
While the existing literature is rich in testing the impact of IHDs in different circumstances, our
study is to the best of our knowledge unique in comparing their effect to smartphone app-based
feedback mechanisms.
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Figure 1: Sizes of the treatment groups
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Figure 2: Share of customers with treatment as assigned across treatment groups
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3 A first look at the data
This section describes the details of the randomised control trial and how different the groups are
in terms of the data made available for our study. While customers were randomly assigned to
different treatments, they did not necessarily—nor indeed primarily—end up with the treatment to
which they had been assigned. Figure 1 illustrates this noncompliance by showing the proportion
of participants assigned to each group that received their assigned treatment.
Indeed only 9.3% of customers assigned to the SP APP treatment (Installer 1) actually received
this treatment without also receiving the IHD (the remaining 90.7% were given both an IHD and
the SP App). For the ONZO treatment, the corresponding figure is 9.4% for Installer 2 (ONZO
A) and 13.6% for Installer 3 (ONZO B). Only 4% of CAD assigned customers actually received
a CAD (see Figure 2 a). One must also consider whether, once the hardware installation has
been done, the customers adopt the software solution associated with their assigned treatment,
i.e. downloading the ONZO/SP app. The fraction of customers that did so, albeit not necessarily
without IHD, is much higher at approximately 30% for each group apart from CAD (see Figure 2
b).
Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics, which shows that the sample is neatly split between
IHD assigned and non-IHD assigned. On average these consumers use about 0.4 kW of electricity
and historically have been using about 3500 kWh of electricity per year. Notice that 0.4 kW × 24
hours × 365 days = 3504 kWh. Hence, on average at least, the electricity consumption measured
via smart meters seems roughly in line with historic non-smart-metered consumption estimates.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
variable mean p25 p50 p75 p90
IHD 0.43 0.31 0.24 0.36 0.54 0.77 18325
non IHD 0.44 0.32 0.24 0.36 0.54 0.78 18582
IHD 3490 2336 1977 2983 4381 6131 17616
non IHD 3502 2424 1987 2974 4355 6145 17840
Treatment 
assignemnt sd Obs
Average hourly energy 
consumption [kW]
Historic Annual Energy 
Consumption [kWh]
Figure 3: Total days with Smart Meter
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(b) Installer 2(ONZO)
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(c) Installer 3(ONZO)
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Also note that there are no significant differences in either historic or current consumption levels
on average between the different treatment groups.
Figure 3 shows density plots of how long the customers have had a Smart Meter for by the time
the data was collected, i.e. the days since Smart Meter installation. This varies greatly between
installer groups. Note for instance that for Installer 3 a large number of customers had had the
smart meter for as much as 300 days or more at the time of data collection, whereas for Installers
2 and 1 the majority had had it for less than 200 days. The figures don’t suggest that there is
a systematic difference in roll out between treatment groups within a given installer which is in
line with expectations: customers were randomized into treatment groups at the level of customers
groups that were scheduled to receive smart meter roll outs.
4 Balance Tests
In Table 2 we report balance tests for the various treatment groups separately by running regres-
sions of historic energy consumption on the interaction of each installer dummy with the installer’s
respective non-IHD assignment as well as a number of controls, as specified below:
Histc =
∑
i
(βi×nonIHDI{Instc = i} × nonIHDc + βiI{Instc = i}) + βxXc + ǫc (1)
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Table 2: Balance Tests
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Log of historic electricity consumption in kWh per annum
N
o
n
 I
H
D
 a
s
s
ig
n
m
e
n
t Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Installer 2(ONZO) 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Installer 3(ONZO) -0.028 0.001 -0.007
(0.022) (0.013) (0.014)
Installer 4(CAD) 0.044 0.003 -0.035
(0.039) (0.027) (0.025)
Obs 35436 35436 35436
R2 0.030 0.713 0.735
Installer Controls yes yes yes
Invite Month Controls no yes yes
Install Month Controls no yes yes
Historic Energy Quartile Controls no yes yes
no no no
Installer X Invite Month 
 X Install Month X Energy Quartile
where Histc is the (log of) historic energy consumption of consumer c, i indexes installers,
I{Instc = i} is an indicator variable equal to 1 if consumer c is being served by installer i,
nonIHDc is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a customer is randomly selected into the non-IHD
treatment group, Xc is a vector of various additional control variables, and ǫc is an error term. If
the sample is balanced for each of the installer groups we should not reject the null hypotheses
that the βi×nonIHD’s are equal to zero for each of the four groups.
Column 1 of Table 2 reports a regression of equation 1 without further controls Xc. For none
of the treatment groups do we find a significant difference between treatment and control group
which is what we would expect given the random assignment of treatment status. Hence, there is
no need to add further control variables to avoid bias. However, further control variables might be
useful in making estimates more precise. In column 2 we controls for invite month (i.e. the month
when the invitation to upgrade to a smart meter was sent to the customer), install month as well
indicators based on the quartiles of historic energy consumption of the customer. In column 3 we
add further controls by including interactions between all these variables. As in column 1 this does
not lead to any significant differences between treatment and control groups. However, note that
this substantially increases the amount of variation explained by the regression model (R2).
5 First stage
Before discussing the main results, we report regressions of treatment received indicators on treat-
ment assignment in Table 3. These can be thought of as first stage regressions in an Instrumental
Variables setting: a basic requirement is that treatment received is driven by our exogenous treat-
ment assignments in a statistically significant way. In Table 3 we examine this by running regres-
sions similar to equation 1 with various indicators of treatment receipt as the dependent variables.
Column 1 reports results for a regression of an indicator for non-IHD treatment implementation
on the various installer-treatment assignment interactions.4 We see that in all installer groups
non-IHD assignment is a strong driver of non-IHD treatment. However, as we could already see
from Figure 1, the differences between non-IHD assigned and not assigned are not very big; for
instance for Installer 1 our results imply that a customer in the non-IHD assigned group have only
a 5.3 percentage point higher chance of not getting an IHD. Notice that the figure is larger for
Installer 3 with a nearly 10% adoption rate. As discussed before the figure is very low for the CAD
group, because of technical problems in rolling out CADs.
4Note that the indicator for non-IHD treatment adoption is not equal to 0 for IHD-assigned consumers, some of
whom might not have received an IHD because they did not get a smart meter. Equally there is a sizable number
of CAD-assigned customers who ended up—as of sampling time—with neither an IHD nor any software app.
6
Table 3: First stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable App Adoption
N
o
n
 I
H
D
 a
s
s
ig
n
m
e
n
t Installer 1(SPAPP) 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.370***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Installer 2(ONZO) 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.350***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Installer 3(ONZO) 0.098*** 0.037** 0.330***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.011)
Installer 4(CAD) 0.091*** -0.126*** 0.022***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.004)
Obs 35436 35436 35436
R2 0.082 0.106 0.266
Installer Controls yes yes yes
Invite Month Controls yes yes yes
Install Month Controls yes yes yes
Historic Energy Quartile Controls yes yes yes
yes yes yes
Assigned 
treatment adoption
Non standard App 
Adoption
Installer X Invite Month 
 X Install Month X Energy Quartile
Column 2 reports on app adoption (irrespective of how advanced the app is). We see that
customers who were offered the SP APP were about 4.8 percentage points more likely to adopt
an app than customers assigned to a basic app. Adoption rates are lower for CAD customers,
presumably because of the roll out issues. Finally in column 3 we examine the relative likelihood
of adopting a more advanced app; i.e. depending on the installer group that is the Advanced SP
app or the ONZO app. Because only non IHD assigned customers have this option the numbers
are vastly bigger than in column 2; i.e. more than 30% except for installer 4. Also note that
because by definition the likelihood of adoption is zero for IHD assigned customers these relative
probabilities are equivalent to the adoption probability or share as shown in Figure 2b.
6 Main results
Table 4 reports our main results of the effects of various types of treatment on average energy
consumption as reported via smart meters. The first panel reports results in terms of the log of
energy consumption. Hence we can interpret estimates as percentage impacts. Thus for example,
the coefficient for Installer 3 in column 1 implies that the non-IHD assigned customers of Installer 3
use about 3.1% less power on average than Installer 3’s IHD-assigned customers. While this figure
is bigger than for the other installers the coefficient is not significant at either 5 or 10 percent.
However, there are a vast number of factors that determine a customers energy consumption and
the type of energy feedback is likely only a small influence in comparison. Hence, as suggested
already in the discussion of Table 2 it makes sense to include further control variables in order
to reduce the standard error of the estimates. In columns 2 and 3 we include the same control
variables as in Table 2; i.e. in column 2 Invite and Install month as well as Quartile energy bands
controls. This leads to a slightly lower point estimates of -2.5% for customers of Installer 3, however
the effect is now significant at 10%. In column 3 we include in addition a full set of interactions
between those control variables. This strengthens the significance of the results and leaves us with
a point estimat of a 4.1% reduction for Installer 3 customers.
Interestingly, there is also the hint of a positive effect in the CAD group, which may actually
reflect the baseline smart meter effect due to a large group of customers in this group that have
neither received an IHD nor any software-based feedback solution. In other words, simply receiving
a smart meter without any additional feedback mechanism may actually increase consumption,
though we are underpowered to detect this result with statistical significance.
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the results by showing density and cumulative
density plots for every installer group. We see that in installer group 3 the density plots for non-
IHD assigned customers are shifted slightly to the right. Also note that the shift occurs fairly
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Table 4: Regressions of average hourly electricity consumption
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable log of average kW per hour
N
o
n
 I
H
D
 a
s
s
ig
n
m
e
n
t Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Installer 2(ONZO) 0.012 0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Installer 3(ONZO) -0.031 -0.025* -0.041**
(0.020) (0.014) (0.016)
Installer 4(CAD) 0.074* 0.043 0.009
(0.039) (0.029) (0.026)
Obs 35436 35436 35436
R2 0.039 0.613 0.639
Dependent Variable Average kW per hour
N
o
n
 I
H
D
 a
s
s
ig
n
m
e
n
t Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Installer 2(ONZO) 0.011* 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Installer 3(ONZO) -0.013* -0.008 -0.018***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Installer 4(CAD) 0.025* 0.013 0.013
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Obs 35436 35436 35436
R2 0.012 0.514 0.535
Installer Controls yes yes yes
Invite Month Controls no yes yes
Install Month Controls no yes yes
Historic Energy Quartile Controls no yes yes
no no yes
Installer X Invite Month 
 X Install Month X Energy Quartile
8
Figure 4: Density plots for (log of) Electricity Consumption
(a) Installer 1 (SPAPP)
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(b) Installer 2 (ONZO)
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(c) Installer 3 (ONZO)
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(d) Installer 4 (CAD)
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Notes: The figure reports density and cumulative plots of density plots of energy consumption by installer group. Observations are
grouped into (historic energy consumption quartile bands) x (installation month x (invitation letter sent month) cells. Density plots are for
lnEnergy − Cellaverage(lnEnergy).
uniformly across the support.
The lower panel of Table 4 repeats the exercise for the level of consumption (i.e. not in terms
of logs). For our most general specification in column 3 this suggests that for group 3 the ONZO
intervention reduced consumption by 18 Watt on average.
It is important to note that the estimates above are intent-to-treat effects, i.e. average effects
for the group that has been assigned to treatment. As we have seen in the first stage regressions
as well as in Figure 2, only about a third of customers are actually engaging with online apps.
Hence, any effect from such apps can only affect this subset of the treated. This implies that
the actual effect in consumers that are actually using the app must be much higher than 4%
reductions found above. To examine this formally we can run an instrumental variable regression
where the variable indicating non standard app adoption (Column 3 of Table 3) is instrumented by
the random assignment into the non-IHD group. We report the results of this exercise in column 2
of Table 5. The coefficient suggests that the actual reduction for group 3 customers that actually
receive the advanced app treatment is nearly a 14% reduction. In column 1 we also report the
"naive" OLS estimator; i.e. we simply regress energy consumption on the indicator variable of
non standard app adoption. This leads to an estimate of -0.5 for customers of installer 3; i.e. a
smaller effect than in column 2. This would suggest that the kind of customers self selecting into
app usage tend to be higher consumption customers.
Table 6 examines the derogation question in greater detail. In particular we examine whether
there is any heterogeneity in impacts between those customers who had been assigned an advanced
software treatment but also received an IHD and those who were assigned advanced software
treatment and did not receive an IHD. As discussed earlier, if there are differences between these
two groups we cannot necessarily conclude that they are the causal effect of either treatment as
they could be due to selection effects. For instance, it could be the case that more environmentally
conscious consumers—who already use less energy—are also less inclined to demand an IHD, as
they perceive the IHD as a waste of resources. Fortunately, we can test this hypothesis using
historic consumption data.
Column 1 starts with regressions of (log) energy consumption on the same variables as in Table
4 plus in addition a set of indicator variables (one for each installer) indicating whether a particular
customer had not received an IHD (‘non IHD endup’). The coefficient on these variables tells us the
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable estimates of Non standard App adoption
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Dependent Variable Log of historic electricity consumption in kWh per annum
Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.001 -0.005
(0.007) (0.017)
Installer 2(ONZO) 0.002 0.005
(0.009) (0.022)
Installer 3(ONZO) -0.050*** -0.139***
(0.016) (0.054)
Installer 4(CAD) -0.168*** 0.060
(0.041) (0.177)
Obs 35436 35436
R2 0.639 0.638
yes yes
A
d
v
a
n
c
e
d
 A
p
p
 
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
Installer 
X Invite Month 
X Install Month 
X Historic Energy Quartile Controls
difference between consumers that were assigned to not receiving an IHD and who indeed did not
receive any, and those that nevertheless received an IHD. The results suggest that for Installers 1 to
3 there are no differences between IHD adopters and non-adopters. In installer group 4 consumers
without IHD seem to be using substantially less energy. In column 2 we repeat the exercise using
historic energy consumption as the dependent variable, which again shows that for Installers 1 to
3 there is no systematic difference between IHD and non-IHD consumers. There is a large negative
effect for customers in installer group 4 though. What does this mean? Firstly, for group 3: we
find that non-IHD customers are not significantly different from IHD customers in terms of current
consumption. There is also no difference in their historic consumption, which suggests the ONZO
effect found for this group is not dependent on having also an IHD. For group 4 on the other hand
it would seem that the difference between IHD and non IHD is by and large a consequence of some
form of selection of different types of customers in the two groups.
Column 3 examines the same question somewhat differently: instead of a set of indicator
variables representing non-IHD assigned customers overall, we include a set of variables that are
equal to one only if a customer is assigned to non-IHD but ends up having an IHD after all. As a
consequence, the coefficients for non-IHD assignment and non-IHD endup represent the difference
between those customers and non-IHD assigned customers. Consistent with the findings in column
1 we find a 4% reduction for non-IHD assigned, IHD received (non-IHD, IHD) customers. For
(non-IHD, non-IHD) customers, on the other hand, we find a 3.8% reduction, which corresponds
to the results in column 1 since 3.8=4.1-0.3. Hence, in quantitative terms there is not a big
difference between either group. However, note the coefficient in the latter case is not significant.
Hence, from columns 1 and 3 we can conclude that customers who did not receive an IHD in the
non-IHD assigned group of installer 3 are neither significantly different from those that have been
assigned to non-IHD but have received one, nor are they significantly different from IHD-assigned
customers. Put differently, the evidence is not powerful enough to make a clear distinction, though
quantitatively the (non-IHD, non-IHD) group is more similar to the (non-IHD, IHD) group. One
important factor impacting the power of this result is the sample size both in terms of number
of customers assigned to each group as well as the length of time we observe them. As the trial
continues to progress, there is a good chance that we will have more reliable evidence on this front.
7 Conclusion and discussion
Our results provide clear evidence of a strong negative effect of some form of app-based feedback
on energy consumption. We also find that this effect might depend either on the specific target
population or on the way that the technology is introduced by customer-facing companies. Another
issue could have to do with the length of time different customer groups have been exposed to a
particular treatment. Note from Figure 3 that the installer group 3 also happens to have been
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Table 6: The derogation question
(1) (2) (3)
Historic
Dependent Variable log of kWh Dependent Variable
N
o
n
 I
H
D
 a
s
s
ig
n
m
e
n
t Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.001 -0.000 Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Installer 2(ONZO) -0.000 0.005 Installer 2(ONZO) -0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Installer 3(ONZO) -0.041** -0.007 Installer 3(ONZO) -0.041**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Installer 4(CAD) 0.056** 0.021 Installer 4(CAD) 0.056**
(0.026) (0.021) (0.026)
Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.008 -0.005 Installer 1(SPAPP) -0.009
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Installer 2(ONZO) 0.020 -0.012 Installer 2(ONZO) 0.020
(0.020) (0.013) (0.020)
Installer 3(ONZO) 0.003 -0.004 Installer 3(ONZO) -0.038
(0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
Installer 4(CAD) -0.214*** -0.253*** Installer 4(CAD) -0.158***
(0.049) (0.058) (0.051)
Obs 35436 35436 Obs 35436
R2 0.639 0.736 R2 0.639
Installer Controls yes yes yes
Invite Month Controls yes yes yes
Install Month Controls yes yes yes
Historic Energy Quartile Controls yes yes yes
yes yes yes
log of average 
kW per hour
log of average 
kW per hour
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Figure 5: Likelihood of half hourly readings sign up
0
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10
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20
%
Installer 1(SPAPP) Installer 2(ONZO)  Installer 3(ONZO)  Installer 4 (CAD) 
IHD Non IHD
Notes: The figure reports estimates of the likelihood that a consumer signs up for half hourly smart meter readings. We see that the
propensity for this is generally low (below 15%) but that there is huge variation across different installer groups; e.g. customers of installer 2
have a less than 5% chance of signing up whereas customers of installer 3 have a more than 10% chance.
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exposed to the treatment for a longer period of time. In further research we hope to understand
better which of these factors is most relevant. It is also important to better understand which
aspects of the advanced apps could be responsible for the effect: the relevant app (ONZO) that
leads to the impact on consumption differentiates itself from the others along several dimensions,
including social comparisons and demand disaggregation. This question could easily and cheaply
be answered by rolling out various versions of the ONZO app even among existing smart meter
customers.
One important problem of the present study in the context of the smart meter derogation is
that we cannot fully ascertain the differential effects of app-only and app-plus-IHD treatment. We
have some evidence to this effect from the comparison of the energy consumption of customers
falling in those two groups, which suggests that there is no significant difference between them and
hence the reduction in energy consumption due to ONZO treatment would seem to be independent
of the availability of IHDs. However, we also find that this result is not necessarily very powerful
in a statistical sense. There is hope that the power of the test will improve as more data from the
ongoing trials become available.
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Figure 6: Density plots for (log of) Historic Energy Consumption
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(b) Installer 2 (ONZO)
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(c) Installer 3 (ONZO)
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(d) Installer 4 (ONZO)
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Notes: The figure reports density and cumulative plots of density plots of historic energy consumption by installer group. Observations
are grouped into (historic energy consumption quartile bands) x (installation month x (invitation letter sent month) cells. Density plots are
for lnEnergy − Cellaverage(lnEnergy).
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